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  1. Introduction
Patent law and antitrust concerns were born side by side. The Statute of Monopolies
(1623) banned any monopoly or letters patent \for the sole Buying, Selling, Making,
Working or Using of any Thing within this Realm," but made an explicit exception
for patents on inventions. Modern antitrust policy follows the general prohibition of
monopolies while modern patent law descends from the exception. For most of the
20th century, the dividing line between these two bodies of law has been controversial.
The basic problem is that having the exclusive right to make, use, or sell an invention
may not be worth much unless the inventor can exercise it in concert with others
through licenses and agreements. When, if ever, should licensing run afoul of the
antitrust laws?1
Antitrust policy in the U.S. is largely governed by \rule of reason." Under rule
of reason, courts make a case-by-case determination of whether harm to competition is
outweighed by the e±ciency bene¯ts of the business practice or transaction in question.
Rule of reason balances di®erent types of harm to consumers. In the patents context,
harm to consumers can arise because the incentive to innovate is sti°ed ex ante or
b e c a u s ep r i c e sa r et o oh i g hex post. Courts currently follow a rule-of-reason approach
for a wide variety of license restrictions (Weinschel 2000 at 2:90).
In contrast to the rule-of-reason approach, U.S. courts have sometimes ex-
empted certain licensing restrictions from antitrust scrutiny altogether. Modern case
law starts with the Supreme Court's 1926 opinion in U.S. v. General Electric,w h i c h
held that a patentholder can ¯x its licensee's price, even if such price ¯xing would
be illegal absent the patent. Courts have also upheld other restrictions, such as re-
stricting the licensee to certain customers (General Talking Pictures 1938; Schlicher
2002, 11:193) or certain geographic markets (Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley 2004, at
1License restrictions can be challenged under several legal theories including (a) \restraint of
trade" under the antitrust laws and/or (b) \misuse" amounting to a defense to infringement under
the patent laws (Morton Salt 1942). Historically, some licenses have been acceptable under one
standard but not the other. Nothing in the present paper turns on these distinctions and we ignore
them in what follows.
133:18). On the other hand, the General Electric rule does not extend to all possible
transactions. For example, the \¯rst sale" doctrine says that the General Electric
exemption is only available for the ¯rst transaction where the owner receives value for
his patented good (Malinckrodt 1990). Similarly, the \tying" doctrine (Morton Salt
1942) says that General Electric immunity does not apply to contracts that restrict
unpatented items, even where those items are inputs for using the patented technol-
ogy. Finally, price-setting immunity does not apply where the real purpose of the
restriction is to cartelize a separate market (Ethyl 1940).
The General Electric case has remained intensely controversial throughout its
long history. The U.S. Supreme Court came within a single vote of overturning it in
1947 and again in 1964. Had it done so, all license restrictions would now be judged
under rule of reason, as the U.S. Department of Justice and legal commentators have
advocated more or less continuously since General Electric was adopted (Hovenkamp,
et. al., 2004, at 31:22,29-31,35-36). While opposition has not yet caused General
Electric to be overturned, courts have been reluctant to extend the price-¯xing ex-
ception beyond its original facts.2 Some commentators argue that these limitations
have reduced General Electric to a \vestige" and advise practitioners that it is not
\prudent" to rely on the case (Weinschel 2000, at 2:47).
We know of no legal or economic theory that uni¯es these disparate decisions
about restrictive terms in licenses. To the contrary, a leading legal commentator,
Chisum (2001), explains that \from the decisions, it is clear that the courts lack a clear
and general theory for resolving this inquiry. Thus, individual problems are resolved
in a piecemeal fashion, and it is di±cult to harmonize decisions in one area (such as
2For example, General Electric may not apply to the unpatented product of a patented machine
(Weinschel 2000 at 2:46, 2:95-96; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 31:27-29), to patentholders with
multiple licensees (Weinschel 2000, 2:107 & n. 19; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 31:817-18), to
patentholders who do not manufacture the patented item (Schlicher 2002 11:179; Hovenkamp, et. al.,
2004, at 31:20; Royal Industries 1969), to licenses that are said to \predominantly bene¯t" licensees
rather than the patentholder (Weinschel 2000, 2:107; Ethyl 1940), to licenses where the patent does
not \completely cover" the product (Schlicher 2002 11:179; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 31:25), to
patentholders who acquire their rights by purchase rather than internal R&D (Hovenkamp, et. al.,
2004, at 31:19), or to intellectual property rights other than patents (Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at
31:30-35; Interstate Circuit 1939).
2price restrictions) with another (such as ¯eld of use restrictions)." Blue ribbon panels
have complained that the resulting uncertainty has produced \a reluctance by patent
owners to license their inventions" since the 1950's. (See Hensley 1967.)
Given this history of uncertainty and confusion, it is appropriate to ask whether
the General Electric rule makes sense, or alternatively whether it should be abandoned
in favor of rule of reason. It may seem tautological that rule of reason is better, since a
case-by-case approach can be taillored to ¯t individual circumstances. However, that
is too simplistic, since it is also di±cult to apply rule of reason in a predictable and
principled way. If di®erent courts implement di®erent principles,3 then rule of reason
may have the deleterious e®ects of creating uncertainty for patentholders and rewriting
the incentives that Congress thought it provided. We return to the advantages and
disadvantages of rule of reason below.
Any attempt to delineate the boundary between antitrust law and patent law
must address the fundamental tension between them. Antitrust law is normally hostile
to restrictions that promote monopoly. However, from a patent law perspective, the
Supreme Court has recognized that \[t]he very object of [the patent laws] is monopoly"
and that \[t]he fact that the conditions of the contract keep up the monopoly does not
render them illegal." (Bement 1902) But this begs the question of which contract
restrictions are needed to \keep up the monopoly." Judges have opined that a license
cannot be used to create a monopoly on any product other than the invention itself
(Id. at 11:34); that \[t]he patentee is entitled to exact the full value of his invention
but is not entitled to endanger competition in other areas by manipulating his patent
monopoly" (Bement 1902); and that the patent monopoly should exclude \all that is
n o te m b r a c e di nt h ei n v e n t i o n . "( Morton Salt 1942). In fact, any other stance would
be unconstitutional. Neither Congress nor the courts can give a patentee \more than
the rewards of his discovery." (Hensley 1967; Line Material 1948 (Douglas concurring))
We paraphrase these cases as embodying the principle that the patentholder
3For two very di®erent visions of what rule of reason might look like, see Line Material (1948).
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion stresses ex post e±ciency with little or no consideration of ex ante
incentives. Justice Burton's dissenting opinion stresses ex ante incentives over ex post ine±ciency.
3must earn her reward, if at all, from the social value of the invention. We call this the
just-reward principle. For example, pro¯t earned by cartelizing an existing market
would not satisfy the just-reward principle, since the pro¯t derives from the cartel,
and not from the invention. In our view, the just-reward principle also explains why
courts condemn sham licenses. In a sham license, the intellectual property right is an
excuse to create a cartel that would be pro¯table even if the invention had no value.
We say more about how to apply the just-reward principle when we discuss product
enhancements below.
We also interpret the case law as suggesting two additional principles, pro¯t
neutrality and minimalism. Pro¯t neutrality means that the patentee's opportunity
to pro¯t should not depend on his ability to work the patent. His ability to work the
patent may depend on such accidents of history as whether he owns manufacturing
facilities, is liquid, or has access to ¯nancing. Licensing may be the only way to
overcome such circumstances.
Minimalism means that licenses should not contain more restrictions than re-
quired to achieve pro¯t neutrality. The minimalist principle recognizes that super°u-
ous restrictions increase the risk of collusion. General Electric immunity might invite
conspirators to design sham transactions that implement ordinary collusion under the
guise of legitimate licensing (Ethyl 1940; Line Material 1948). In that case, the re-
turns from the transaction would not derive from the social value of the invention or
implement the incentive intended by Congress. The Supreme Court has struck down
licensing provisions when \[t]he licensing conditions are ... not used as a means of stim-
ulating the commercial development and ¯nancial returns of the patented invention
which is licensed, but for the commercial development [of defendants' businesses]."
(Ethyl 1940) Courts are famously and justi¯ably leery of letting licensors extend the
patent monopoly granted by Congress to other products. At least one court has
made the link between pro¯t neutrality and minimalism explicit: \The patentee can
obtain the full reward of the patent in the ¯rst sale; a right to restrict the goods in
more remote channels of trade is not a traditional part of the patent grant nor is it
needed in order for the patentee to fully enjoy the monopoly of the patent." (Shapiro
41979, emphasis supplied) A key question is whether such an assertion is true. If
so, the ¯rst-sale rule is both consistent with neutrality and required by minimalism.
However, we argue below that there are circumstances in which the ¯rst-sale principle
cannot be reconciled with pro¯t neutrality.
We have already noted that some legal scholars think the General Electric
exception has been reduced to a mere \vestige." But the fact that General Electric
immunizes only a few licensing restrictions does not necessarily imply that the doctrine
is \vestigial." The question is whether the boundaries are drawn in the right place.
We argue below that the just-reward, neutrality, and minimalism principles go a long
distance toward rationalizing the case law.
In section 2, we consider the licensing of a product patent, as in General Elec-
tric. In section 3 we consider product enhancements or additives as in Ethyl Gasoline
and Line Material. In section 4 we comment on how our conclusions relate to the
¯rst-sale rule. In section 5 we return to rule of reason, and in section 6 we compare
rule of reason with the per se approach embedded in our three principles. In section
7w eg i v es o m es u m m a r yc o n c l u s i o n sa b o u tw h a tt h i sa n a l y s i st e a c h e su s .
2. Licensing New Products
We ¯rst consider the licensing of product patents, as in General Electric. The pro-
competitive reason for licensing would typically be productive e±ciency { that is, dis-
tributing the manufacturing in a way that achieves lowest total cost. If the marginal
cost of manufacturing the product is increasing, production costs are minimized by
producing in several ¯rms rather than one. Accounting also for the setup costs of
the plants, we will assume without loss of generality that the e±cient number of
production facilities is two.
As a benchmark case, we ¯rst assume that the patentholder owns the two
production facilities himself, and decides how much to supply. He earns all the revenue
and bears all the costs. We view the resulting pro¯t as that which was intended by
5Congress, and evaluate the neutrality of various licensing schemes according to whether
they generate the same pro¯t.
There are many reasons that the patentholder may not be situated to serve
the whole market, such as that he cannot raise the money to build production or
distribution facilities. Our neutrality principle is that the patentholder's reward should
not depend on who owns the plants that produce and distribute the output.
We ¯rst show that the minimal set of licensing instruments required for neu-
trality includes only royalties and ¯xed fees in the extreme case that the entire supply
is contracted out. Courts routinely approve licenses with ¯xed fees and per-unit roy-
alties (Brulotte 1964). However we show in the subsection after this that these simple
and uncontroversial licensing tools do not lead to neutrality in the intermediate case
where the patentholder supplies some of the market, and competes with licensees.
Suppose that the inverse demand curve (the willingness to pay for the marginal
unit at quantity q)i sd e ¯ n e db yp(q)=1¡q; where q is the total supply of all ¯rms.4
When there are two ¯rms supplying the market with quantities q1;q 2; the market price
will therefore be p(q1 + q2)=1¡ (q1 + q2):





°(^ q)d^ q (2.1)
where °(¢) is the marginal cost curve in each facility. We ignore the ¯xed costs here,
assuming that they justify the use of two and only two facilities.
The benchmark case is that the market is supplied by a single ¯rm using two
facilities. The pro¯t-maximizing total supply q¤, which maximizes (2.1), satis¯es the
4The easiest interpretation is that each agent buys a ¯xed amount of the good in each period,
which we shall understand as one unit. The potential buyers are indexed by their willingness to pay
µ 2 (0;1). If agent µ buys the good at price p; his utility is µ ¡ p.I f µ is uniformly distributed on
the interval (0;1); the number of agents for whom µ ¡ p>0i s1¡ p: If q units of the good are
supplied, the market-clearing price is 1 ¡ q; since that is the price that provides nonnegative utility
to the q buyers with µ>1 ¡q, but negative utility to the others.
















We now turn to the case that, instead of producing in two production facilities
himself, the patentholder has two licensees. The pro¯t will be generated through
production decisions of the two licensees, and will be shared with the licensor through
royalties and ¯xed fees, (½;F):
We will consider Cournot competition, where each licensee chooses its supply
optimally, taking the other ¯rm's supply as given. Our objective is to characterize
the equilibrium such that neither ¯rm has an incentive to change its supply. The
equilibrium supplies will depend on the royalty rate ½. We will show that the following








Conditional on the royalty ½, we will write pro¯t of ¯rm 1 as
(p(q1 + q2) ¡ ½) q1 ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (2.5)
Firm 1 takes the supply of the other ¯rm, q2; as ¯xed, and optimizes by choice of its




(1 ¡ q2 ¡ ½ ¡ °(q1)) (2.6)
Similarly, ¯rm 2's pro¯t as a function of q2; taking q1 as ¯xed, is
(p(q1 + q2) ¡ ½) q2 ¡
Z q2
0
°(^ q)d^ q (2.7)




(1 ¡ q1 ¡ ½ ¡ °(q2)) (2.8)




2 )w h e n½ is de¯ned




2 ) are an equilibrium.
However, the licensor is not collecting all the pro¯t in royalties. This can be seen
directly from the above calculations, but it is always true that Cournot competitors
(oligopolists) earn positive pro¯t, regardless of whether part of their \marginal cost"
is royalty. The licensor can collect the remainder of the pro¯t through the ¯xed fees
F: (If the setup costs are high enough, the ¯xed fees may be negative { payments
from the patentholder to the licensee.)
The foregoing shows that, using only royalties and ¯xed fees, the patentholder
can collect as much pro¯t from two licensees as by producing himself. Although paten-
tholders have the right to impose quantity restrictions on their licensees (Schlicher
2002; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 32:3), pro¯t neutrality does not require such re-
strictions in the case where the entire supply is contracted out.
This changes when the patentholder operates one of the production facilities
himself and licenses another ¯rm to operate the other. In that case, royalties and ¯xed
fees do not lead to pro¯t neutrality. Additional licensing instruments we consider in
the next section are
1. Fixing the licensee's price.
2. Imposing a price-matching clause, as in General Electric.
3. Restricting the licensee's output.
4. Restricting the licensor's own output.
5. Allowing the royalty rate to decrease with the licensee's supply.
6. Allowing the royalty rate to decrease with the licensor's supply.
8We argue that only instruments 2, 4 and 6 provide as much pro¯t as the
benchmark case.
2.1. Licensor Competes with Licensee: Nonneutrality
To see the nonneutrality of royalties and ¯xed fees, suppose that there is a single
licensee at (constant) royalty ½; and that the licensor, called ¯rm 1, also supplies part
of the market: Let the licensee be ¯rm 2. The pro¯t of the licensor, ¯rm 1, is




If the licensor takes the licensee's output q2 as given, and optimizes with respect to




(1 ¡ q2 ¡ °(q1)) (2.9)
The pro¯t of the licensee, ¯rm 2, is









(1 ¡ q1 ¡ °(q2) ¡ ½) (2.10)
It follows from (2.9) and (2.10) that, in equilibrium,
q1 + °(q1)=q2 + ½ + °(q2) (2.11)
Since the two ¯rms will not produce the same quantities, the aggregate supply is not
produced e±ciently at any positive royalty rate. Conditional on (2.11), there may be
a royalty rate that supports the price p(q¤); but the licensor will still not receive the
maximum pro¯t, due to productive ine±ciency. By productive ine±ciency, we mean
9that total costs, conditional on the output, are unnecessarily high. Since the licensor
produces more than the licensee, the marginal cost of his last unit of supply is higher
than the marginal cost of the licensee's last unit of supply. Costs could be saved if
the licensee supplied more and the licensor supplied less. Moreover, this shows that
if the licensee is induced to supply half the pro¯t-maximizing quantity, as intended,
the licensor will increase his own supply beyond half the monopoly quantity. He gets
marginal revenue from each additional unit supplied, while losing only half the revenue
that is lost due to the fall in price. The other half is a loss imposed on the licensee.
Intuitively, the problem that arises here is that the licensor will exploit the
licensee after the royalty agreement is in place. Once the royalty agreement is in
place, and the licensee makes the decision to supply half the monopoly output,
q¤
2 ; as
intended, the royalties and ¯xed fees that the licensor collects from the licensee are
¯xed. An increase in supply by the licensor will not change them. An increase in
supply by the licensor will impose a loss on the licensee through the fall in price, but
this is not his concern once the agreement is in place.
The problem is that the prospect of such ex post opportunism undermines the
licensor's ex ante pro¯t. The licensee will rationally predict that, after the license
is signed, the licensor will supply more units than the pro¯t-maximizing number of
units
q¤
2 ; and the market price will be lower than the pro¯t-maximizing price. The
licensee realizes that the licensor's ex post supply decision will erode his own pro¯t.
The terms that the licensee will accept at the outset will re°ect this prediction. As a
consequence, the licensor cannot charge the ¯xed fees that he could charge if he could
commit to producing only half the monopoly output,
q¤
2 .
The easiest way to ¯x the problem is to allow the licensor to cap his own output
at
q¤
2 , as part of the license. Such a commitment improves the terms of license that
the licensee will agree to, since the licensee is then guaranteed that the market price
will be the monopoly price. Since the resulting license would be pro¯t neutral with
respect to the benchmark, we see nothing wrong with such a commitment. Courts
have held that restricting the licensee's output does not pose an antitrust problem
10(General Talking Pictures 1938; Weinschel 2000, 2:91; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at
32:1:3), but we are unaware of any case where restricting the licensor's output has
been challenged.
2.2. Competition with Price Restrictions
As we have already pointed out, a solution to the incentive problem is for the licensor
not to produce at all, and to have two licensees. We now ask whether the General
Electric rule can also be a solution when the patentholder has manufacturing capa-
bility. The General Electric price-¯xing exception allows the licensor to set the price
for both the licensor and the licensee.
We should say at the outset that competition is messy when prices can be
¯xed. The notion of competition used above was competition in supply. With the
licensing terms in place, each ¯rm made an independent choice of supply, and the
market price then adjusted to ensure that all the units were sold. That notion must
now be modi¯ed, since prices are not allowed to change endogenously in order to clear
the market. For example, if the total supply exceeds demand at the ¯xed price, then
¯rms will end up with excess supply. This should not happen in equilibrium, but in
order to test whether the supply decisions are an equilibrium, we need some notion of
what would happen if a ¯rm changed its supply.
For the General Electric price-¯xing rule, we will again assume that ¯rms make
their supply decisions after the licensing terms have been set. We interpret the price-
matching rule to mean that the licensor can set the price at which both ¯rms sell. In
addition, the agreement may specify royalties and ¯xed fees. With this agreement in
place, the ¯rms choose their supplies.






and setting the ¯xed fee so that the licensee's pro¯t is zero if both ¯rms produce
q¤
2 :
11If neither ¯rm wants to deviate from half the monopoly supply,
q¤
2 ; then the licensor
gets all the pro¯t and production is e±cient.
We will check whether either ¯rm wants to deviate, conditional on the supply
of the other. Consider ¯rst the licensee, and suppose that the licensor is supplying
q¤
2 :
The licensee cannot bene¯t by reducing supply from
q¤
2 to something less, because each
of the inframarginal units provides him with revenue (price) higher than the royalty
plus marginal cost. The licensee also cannot bene¯t by increasing supply above
q¤
2 :
If he increases supply, the market will have an excess supply at price p(q¤): If the
licensee does not manage to sell his marginal units, then he has wasted the cost of
producing them. If he does sell them, he cannot cover costs, since p(q¤)¡(½+°(q)) <
p(q¤) ¡ (½ + °(
q¤
2 )) for q>
q¤
2 .
What about the licensor? Will he also be content to supply
q¤
2 ?H e h a s
no incentive to produce less, since the marginal units provide him pro¯t in amount
p(q¤)¡°(q); which is positive for q ·
q¤
2 : If he produces more, then either the marginal
unit crowds out a unit that would otherwise be sold by the licensee, or the marginal
unit is not sold at all. If not sold, it wastes the costs of production. If it crowds out a
unit sold by the licensee, then the licensor loses the royalty ½ on that unit. But using
(2.12) and the fact that °(¢) is increasing, it follows that ½>p (q¤) ¡ °(q)f o rq>
q¤
2 ;
hence the licensor prefers to collect the royalty from the licensee than to crowd out
that unit and produce it himself.
This proves that with the license terms speci¯ed { a royalty that satis¯es (2.12)
and price ¯xing { there is an equilibrium with pro¯t-maximizing production, even
though the licensor competes with the licensee. The licensor can collect all the pro¯t
through ¯xed fees and royalties.5
5A slight embarrassment, however, is that, depending on how excess supply is rationed, there can
be other equilibria with the property that q1 + q2 = q¤ (where q1;q 2 are respectively the supplied
quantities of the licensor and licensee), and q2 <
q¤
2 : Even if such an equilibrium exists, it will not be
preferred by either party to the equilibrium in which the ¯rms supply q1 = q2 =
q¤
2 : By moving to the
equilibrium with equal ouputs, the licensee bene¯ts because the price he receives on the additional
units is larger than the royalty plus marginal cost. The licensor bene¯ts because the royalty he
receives on the units transferred to the licensee is larger than the price net of costs of his own supply.
In economic games with two equilibria, where both parties prefer one equilibrium to the other, it is
12Thus, the General Electric Company chose a rule that implements pro¯t neu-
trality. Its solution was also \minimalist." We argue in section 8.1 that General
Electric could not have achieved the same result by ¯xing the price of the licensee
without ¯xing his own.
2.3. Nonlinear Royalties
Our ¯nal scheme is to consider nonlinear royalties. Of course constant royalties and
¯xed fees are a form of nonlinear royalty, but payments of this form will not guarantee
pro¯t neutrality when the licensor and licensee compete.
As we showed above, the licensor can pro¯t by committing himself not to
expand output beyond q1 =
q¤
2 once the license is in place: His incentive to expand
output follows from the fact that he earns royalties on the licensee's output in any
case, and can earn even more pro¯t by expanding the market. Even though his
expansion reduces the market price, the licensee bears half of that loss, while the
licensor continues to collect royalties, and also sells the additional units. The problem
is that, since the licensee can predict this outcome, he will not sign a license agreement
in the ¯rst place that provides monopoly pro¯t to the licensor. Thus, the licensor can
do better by committing not to expand output once the license is in place.
Suppose that instead of imposing a ¯xed royalty, the licensor imposes a royalty
rate ½ that falls with his own output. The fall in royalty rate will punish the licensor
for expanding output, and thus creates a commitment not to do so. This will solve







2 and ½0(¢)=¡1: The higher the licensor's output, the less royalty he
gets, and this will commit him not to increase output beyond
q¤
2 :
easy to ensure that the better equilibrium is played. One of the players can simply announce that
he intends to play his strategy in the preferred equilibrium, and the other player will follow. No
commitments or license terms are required to implement this outcome. It is self-enforcing.
13Firm 1's pro¯t is








(1 ¡ q2 + ½
0(q1)q2 ¡ °(q1))
Firm 2's pro¯t is













2 ); neither ¯rm has an incentive to deviate.
Of course this scheme requires that the licensor send a royalty bill to the licensee
based on the licensor's own output. It might create an enforcement nightmare for
the licensee. The licensor will always want to argue that his supply was lower than
it was, and the licensee will want to argue that it was higher.
Nonlinear royalties based on the licensee's supply are common and at least two
courts have said that such agreements do not violate the antitrust laws (Stockham
Valves 1966; DuPont 1953). However, in the model presented here, royalties that
increase or decrease with the licensee's supply will not lead to pro¯t neutrality because
they do not punish the licensor for trying to exploit the licensee once the terms of
license are ¯xed. To punish the licensor for increasing supply beyond that to which
he would like to commit, the royalty must depend on the licensor's supply, not the
licensee's supply.
This is a good place to return to our inquiry about minimalism. The point of
stipulating royalties that decline with the licensor's output is to soften the competition
14that the licensor provides to the licensee. It is even more direct to write license terms
that restrict the licensor's supply. Many commentators believe, on somewhat slender
case law, that U.S. law permits patentholders to impose minimum output levels on
their licensees (Weinschel 2000, 2-91; Hovenkamp, et. al., 2004, at 32:9), but we know
of no cases in which a licensor's commitment to self-restraint has been at issue.
3. Licensing Patents on Enhancements
A di®erent economic context in which the price-¯xing exception was considered was
a patented enhancement to an existing product. In Ethyl Gasoline, the patentholder
had the rights to a gasoline additive (tetraethyl lead) that raised the gasoline's octane
rating. Licensed re¯ners were not allowed to sell gasoline containing the additive to
unlicensed middlemen (\jobbers") and jobbers who failed to observe the major re-
¯neries' posted prices were regularly terminated for displaying poor \business ethics."
The net e®ect was to set the price at which licensed jobbers could sell high perfor-
mance gasoline. The court struck down the jobbers' licenses on the ground that they
violated the antitrust laws.
In considering proprietary enhancements to existing goods, we will assume
that each consumer's willingness to pay for the enhanced product is larger than for
the original product by amount ¢: Applying the just-reward principle, the inventor
should not receive more than ¢ per unit sold..
As before, we will suppose that the demand for the underlying good, say,
unenhanced gasoline, is given by a function 1 ¡ p; where p is the price, and that the
inverse demand curve is therefore given by 1 ¡ q: Suppose that the marginal cost of
a unit of unenhanced gasoline is c · 1 and that the additive increases the willingness
to pay for each unit of gasoline by ¢ · 1. Then the demand for enhanced gasoline
at price p is 1+¢¡p; and the willingness to pay for the qth unit (the inverse demand
curve) becomes p(q)=1+¢¡ q:
We will not yet make a distinction between selling the additive at a proprietary
15price or licensing the right to produce gasoline that includes the additive. In both
c a s e s ,w ew i l lr e f e rt ot h ep r i c eo rr o y a l t ya s½:
3.1. Patented Enhancements to Nonproprietary Goods
Assume for simplicity that the resource cost of producing the additive is zero, and
the unit cost of producing gasoline (enhanced or unenhanced) is c. In a competitive
market, the cost of enhanced gasoline will then be p = c+½ if ½ is the wholesale price
of the additive or the royalty for adding it to the gasoline. If the licensor charges the
entire value as royalty, ½ =¢ ; the price of gasoline will go up by ¢; so that sales of
the enhanced gasoline are the same as without the additive. During the life of the
patent, it is the patentholder rather than user who collects the social value. This is
consistent with the just-reward principle that the pro¯t must derive from the social
value.
Further, provided the total demand for gasoline is relatively large, the licensor's
pro¯t is maximized by charging ½ = ¢ in a competitive market. No distributor would
buy the additive at a price greater than ½ =¢ ; so 0 <½· ¢: In addition, it cannot
generally be more pro¯table to charge a royalty less than ¢: The licensor's pro¯t is
½(1 + ¢ ¡ ½ ¡ c): This pro¯t increases in ½ whenever 1 + ¢ ¡ c>2½: But since
¢ ¸ ½ it is enough that 1¡c>¢: Since 1¡c is the demand for unenhanced gasoline
at the competitive price, this condition can be interpreted to mean that the licensor
will charge a royalty equal to the full value of the additive whenever the demand for
gasoline is large relative to the value of the additive.
It seems clear under the just-reward principle that the licensor should be al-
lowed to pro¯t in amount ¢ per unit of gasoline sold, but not more. This is true even
if gasoline suppliers operate as oligopolists in the distribution of gasoline, rather than
as perfect competitors. Suppose, in particular, that there are only two gasoline sellers,
¯rms 1 and 2. Neither will take a license on the additive at a royalty or wholesale
price greater than ¢; since a re¯ner can sell the same amount of unenhanced gasoline
at price p ¡ ¢ as enhanced gasoline at price p. If the royalty is greater than ¢; it is
16more pro¯table to sell unenhanced gasoline.
If both ¯rms license at royalty ½ and sell the enhanced gasoline, ¯rm 1 chooses
the supply q1 that maximizes pro¯t, de¯ned as follows, assuming that the supply q2
of the other ¯rm is ¯xed:
(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ q2)q1 ¡ (c + ½)q1




(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ (c + ½))





(1 + ¢ ¡ c ¡ ½) (3.1)




½(1 + ¢ ¡ c ¡ ½)
Exactly as for the competitive case, the optimum is to set ½ = ¢ provided demand is
large relative to ¢:
The oligopolist re¯ners (gasoline suppliers) earn pro¯t in the oligopoly, regard-
less of the royalty they pay; that is the nature of oligopoly. Although the licensor
would like to get its hands on that pro¯t, the licensor is not entitled to it under the
just-reward principle. The oligopolists earn pro¯t regardless of whether there is a
product enhancement; the pro¯t earned by the oligopolists was not created by the
proprietor of the enhancement.
Further, there is no reason that the oligopolists would give up their pro¯t
by licensing the enhancement. However this does not nullify the threat of \sham
licensing." The three ¯rms together could pro¯t from cartelizing the market so that
17they jointly earn monopoly pro¯t instead of oligopoly pro¯t. It is this threat that the
minimalist principle seeks to curb.
To reiterate, by sham licensing we mean that the licensor can use the intellectual
property right to cartelize the market, and earn pro¯t from the cartelization rather
than from the value of the invention. The most pro¯table arrangement is to keep
unenhanced gasoline o® the market and to sell the monopoly output of enhanced
gasoline, namely, the q that maximizes
(1 + ¢ ¡ q ¡ c)q
The parenthetic term is the sales price when q units of enhanced gasoline are supplied.





(1 + ¢ ¡ c) (3.2)
and the corresponding market-clearing price is
p(q




(1 + ¢ + c) (3.3)
In order to see the potential for sham licensing, it is useful to think of ¢ as close to
zero. By the just-reward principle, the patentholder's reward should also be close to
zero. Instead, with sham licensing, the patentholder's reward will include pro¯t made
available through cartelization.
The following license terms will support the monopoly price, provided both
gasoline distributors take the license. One can see from (3.1) and (3.2) (and anal-
ogously to our discussion in section 2.1) that a royalty of ½ =
1
2q¤ (¢) supports the
monopoly output.
1. Charge a royalty ½ =
1
2q¤ (¢) for producing and using the additive, stipulating
that licensees cannot avoid the royalty by reverting to unenhanced gasoline.
Share the pro¯t through ¯xed fees.
182. Charge a ¯xed fee for producing and using the additive, stipulating that the
price of enhanced gasoline must be p(q¤(¢)), and stipulating that the licensees
cannot sell unenhanced gasoline. Share the pro¯t through ¯xed fees.
A cartel cannot generally be supported unless the license stipulates either that
the licensee will pay royalties on unenhanced gasoline as well as enhanced gasoline,
as in (1), or that the licensee will sell only enhanced gasoline, as in (2). Without
being bound in one of those ways, a licensee can pro¯t by selling unenhanced gasoline
at a price between the marginal cost c and the monopoly price p(q¤(¢)) ¡ ¢. That
will break the cartel. Because the license terms (1) and (2) will support a cartel, they
should not be allowed.
Of course, entry will also break the cartel. If there is always a threat of entry
by an unlicensed entrant, the market price for unenhanced gasoline must be p = c;
and the price of enhanced gasoline can be no greater than c +¢ : Higher prices will
elicit entry.
The reader will have no trouble seeing that cost reductions can be analyzed in
the same way as product enhancements. Instead of adding to the product's value,
suppose the innovation reduces the cost of manufacturing it. Whether ¢ is conceived
as a boost to the consumer's willingness to pay for the product or a reduction in the cost
of manufacturing it, the innovation would increase the consumers' surplus available
in a competitive market by ¢ per unit. For reasons analogous to the ones given
here, allowing the licensor to ¯x prices would allow him to pro¯t from cartelization
rather than pro¯ting from the social value he created, in violation of the just-reward
principle. Instruments to ¯x the monopoly price will take the same forms as above,
e:g:; binding the licensees to pay royalties regardless of whether they use the patented
innovation, and specifying the price they must charge while preventing them from
reverting to the inferior product.
We conclude that in the case of patented enhancements to unpatented goods,
and also in the case of cost reductions, royalties are a rich enough licensing instru-
ment to collect the pro¯t that Congress intended. Price-setting power is not only
19unnecessary, but allows the licensor to cartelize the market, thus earning pro¯t from a
source (the cartel) not created by the invention. This would violate the just-rewards
principle.
3.2. Patented Enhancements to Patented Goods
In the previous section we supposed that the original good, say gasoline, was supplied
in an unprotected market. We shall now assume that the previous good is itself
proprietary. In this section we assume that the enhanced good does not infringe the
previous patent, and in the next section we assume that it does.
If the two proprietary goods are noninfringing, is there any reason to allow
licensing at all? Given that licensing is not required for productive e±ciency as
de¯ned above, and not required to bring either of the products to market, is licensing
a prima facie sham?
The problem here is that e±ciency means more than productive e±ciency.
Without licensing, one of the proprietors would supply an inferior product, presumably
at a lower price, and some of the consumers would buy it. Depending on prices,
consumers may be better o® if both ¯rms supply the better product. What licensing
terms, if any, should be allowed in order to achieve this result, without undermining
the competition between the patentholders that Congress apparently intended?
Suppose, for example, that the two ¯rms write a licensing agreement that
commits the proprietor of the inferior product, whom we shall call ¯rm 1, to stay out
of the market. Then the proprietor of the enhanced product, whom we shall call ¯rm
2, becomes a monopolist. This is presumably the most pro¯table arrangement for the
two ¯rms, and the proprietor of the better good should be willing to pay his potential
competitor to stay out. Most commentators would agree that such an arrangement
would be collusive, but how does that follow from the principles we have articulated?
What licensing terms are consistent with our principles? Can the allowable licensing
terms ensure that only the better product is supplied, while at the same time avoiding
the collusive outcome?
20We claim that the only licensing arrangement consistent with the just-reward
principle is a license from ¯rm 1 to ¯rm 2, giving the right to produce the enhanced
product in return for royalties and perhaps other fees A license from ¯rm 2 to ¯rm
1 is not consistent with that principle, since ¯rm 1 has nothing of value to o®er ¯rm
2. Cross-licensing is not consistent with the just-reward principle. Further, we show
that the one-way license will not allow the ¯rms to cartelize the market. Despite the
license, the price of the enhanced product will be constrained by potential competition
from the inferior product.
To make our case, we need to characterize the outcomes of three market ar-
rangements: that the patentholders compete without a license, that ¯rm 2 licenses to
¯rm 1 with royalties and perhaps ¯xed fees, and that the ¯rms ¯nd a way to support
the collusive outcome. We will show that the ¯rst two arrangements are equivalent for
consumers, but the second arrangement, one-way licensing, is more pro¯table for the
¯rms. The collusive outcome is more pro¯table still, but imposes the monopoly price
on consumers. Thus, one-way licensing achieves the objective of economic e±ciency
(all consumers consume the better good), while avoiding the collusive outcome.
Let pI be the price of the original, inferior good, and let p be the price of the
enhanced good. Then, since each user has willingness to pay ¢ for the enhancement,
prices must satisfy
p
I =m a x f0;p¡ ¢g (3.4)
With these prices, the demand for units of both products is the same as if both ¯rms
supplied the enhanced product at price p: That is, the number of units demanded
is 1 + ¢ ¡ p; but some of the units will be the inferior product, which provide less
utility in amount ¢ and sell at a price pI that is lower by ¢: For simpler calculations,
and because our focus is not on productive e±ciency, we will now assume that the
marginal cost of production is zero.
We will ¯rst characterize the equilibrium prices without licensing. In evalu-
ating its pro¯t opportunities, ¯rm 1 takes as given ¯rm 2's supply of the enhanced
21good, q2. Firm 1's pro¯t as a function of its own supply of the inferior good, q,i s
(1 ¡ q ¡ q2) q (3.5)




(1 ¡ q2) (3.6)
Similarly, ¯rm 2's pro¯t is
(1 + ¢ ¡ q ¡ q2) q2 (3.7)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q) (3.8)



















We will now show that the second market arrangement, licensing from ¯rm 2
to ¯rm 1, is equivalent for consumers to competition without licensing, and better for
the patentholders. The largest royalty, ½; t h a tw o u l db eo ® e r e do ra c c e p t e di s½ =¢ :
At a larger royalty, ¯rm 1 would supply the inferior good rather than the enhanced
good under license. The constraint ½ · ¢ is the key ingredient to our conclusion that
licensing creates bene¯ts patentholders without harming consumers.
22In evaluating its pro¯t opportunities, the licensee, ¯rm 1, again takes as given
¯rm 2's supply of the enhanced good, q2. Firm 1's pro¯t as a function of its own
supply of the enhanced good, q1,i s
(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ q2 ¡ ½) q1 (3.9)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ ½) (3.10)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q1) (3.11)








(1 + ¢ + ½)
Therefore the price will be
1
3
(1 + ¢ + ½): (3.12)
Total output of the enhanced good will be
1
3
(2(1 + ¢) ¡ ½)
The sum of the two ¯rms' pro¯t is
1
9
(1 + ¢ + ½)(1 + ¢ + ½ +1+¢¡ 2½)=
1
9





2 + ½(1 + ¢) ¡ ½
2)
23The two ¯rms' total pro¯t is increasing in ½; and is greatest at ½ =¢ : Therefore
the price of the enhanced good is the same with and without licensing, namely 1
3(1 +
2¢): This accounts for our claim that consumers are as well o® with licensing as




2 + ¢) (3.13)
which is larger than their pro¯t in competition with each other, in the absence of a
license.
We now compare to the collusive outcome, namely, the outcome if ¯rm 1 re-
nounces its right to supply the inferior product. The monopoly price and quantity of





The collusive pro¯t (3.14) is larger than the pro¯t (3.13) available with one-way li-
censing, and the price of the enhanced good is also higher, 1
2(1 + ¢) > 1
3(1 + 2¢);
i nt h ec a s e( ¢< 1) where the possibility of supplying the inferior good is actually a
constraint in the market:
We conclude that the one-way license allows the proprietor to pro¯t from the
social value of the enhancement without pro¯ting from cartelizing the market. This
is the only type of license that should be allowed under our principles. In contrast, a
cross-license of the type discussed in the next section would allow the two ¯rms to earn
monopoly pro¯ts as if the proprietor of the enhancement created the whole market.
3.3. Blocking Patents on Enhancements
We continue our discussion of the same model, but now assume that the enhanced
product infringes the patent on the original product, so the patentholders have block-
ing patents. This was the situation in Line Material (1948). Since the enhanced
product infringes the patent on the inferior product, the knowledge created by the
24¯rst innovator was presumptively required to develop it. In this sense, the net value
of the enhanced product is presumptively part of the social value created by the ¯rst
innovator, even though the second innovator bore the incremental costs. By the
just-reward principle, the ¯rst innovator is entitled to pro¯t from it.
There are not many possibilities for how to resolve the blocking patents so that
the enhanced product can come to market. They include:
1. Consolidate ownership of the patents (one patentholder sells to the other).
2. Allow the patentholders to cross license the enhanced product, each paying roy-
alties to the other.
3. Allow the patentholders to cross license with royalties, ¯xing the price of the
enhanced good, and stipulating that the inferior good will not compete in the
market.
4. Force the patentholders to cross license without royalties.
We assume that (4) is not what Congress had in mind, as it leads to the same
market outcome as if the patents were not blocking, discussed in section 3.2. We now
show that (2) and (3) are equivalent to (1), provided that the cost of manufacturing the
enhanced good is the same regardless of how the manufacturing is divided between the
¯rms. However, echoing our discussion of section 1, (2) is not equivalent to (1) or (3)
if the manufacturing must be divided in a particular way to achieve cost e±ciencies.
Since the enhancement adds ¢ to every user's willingness to pay, the inverse
demand curve can again be written as p(q)=1+¢¡ q,w h e r eq is the quantity
supplied of the enhanced good, and the inferior good is not supplied. The most
pro¯table arrangement is for only the better product to be produced.6 We will ¯rst
assume that the marginal cost of producing both goods is the same, and for simplicity,
6If users value the enhancement di®erently, it could be more pro¯table to sell both products as a
form of price discrimination.
25that the marginal cost is zero. Then any manufacturing arrangement is equally cost-
e±cient.
C l e a r l yt h em a x i m u mp r o ¯ tc a nb ea c h i e v e di fb o t hp a t e n t e dg o o d sa r eo w n e d
by a single ¯rm (solution (1)). What we will now show is that it can also be achieved
by cross licensing with royalties (solution (2)), but only if the previous patentholder,
whom we again call ¯rm 1, can either renounce his right to supply the inferior product,
or pays a low enough royalty that he has no incentive to supply it.
Assume that the cross license on the enhanced good provides for royalties in
amounts (½1;½ 2); with each ¯rm paying the other: We will show that in order to
sustain the pro¯t maximizing price, these royalties must satisfy
½1 + ½2 =
1
2
(1 + ¢) (3.15)
Further, in order to dissuade ¯rm 1 from undercutting the market by supplying the
inferior product as well, it must hold that ½1 · ¢: However this constraint imposes
no harm provided the cost of aggregate supply does not depend on how the supply
is divided between the ¯rms. That is, it imposes no harm if there is no issue of
productive e±ciency.
With the royalties in place, and assuming that ¯rm 1 does not supply the
inferior good, the ¯rms will choose their most pro¯table supplies, (q1;q 2); realizing
that the price in the market will satisfy
p(q1 + q2)=1+¢¡ q1 ¡ q2:
Taking as given the royalties (½1;½ 2) and the supply q2 of ¯rm 2, ¯rm 1's pro¯t function
is
(p(q1 + q2) ¡ ½1) q1 =( 1+¢¡ q1 ¡ q2 ¡ ½1)q1 (3.16)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ ½1) (3.17)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ ½2) (3.18)
Adding (3.17) and (3.18), it follows that the aggregate equilibrium supply q1 + q2
satis¯es
q1 + q2 =
2
3




But since the objective is to choose the royalties such that the equilibrium quantities
satisfy




(1 + ¢); (3.19)
the condition (3.15) must be satis¯ed.
Further, by (3.17), (3.18), and solving ½1 from (3.15), we can write the equilib-
rium supplies as




(1 + ¢) ¡ ½1
These are the ¯rms' respective supplies if the royalties satisfy (3.15) and the inferior
product is not supplied.







(1 + ¢) ¡ 2½1)+½1
µ1
2
(1 + ¢) ¡ ½1
¶
which is decreasing with the royalty rate it pays, ½1: At ½1 =0( a n d½2 =
1
2(1 +¢));
¯rm 1 supplies the whole market and earns all the pro¯t. Thus, by choosing the
royalties within the range ½1 2 (0;¢); there is scope for dividing pro¯t even without
using ¯xed fees.
27Thus, if the two ¯rms have the same constant marginal cost of supply, we can
conclude that there is a cross licensing arrangement that sustains the maximum pro¯t.
In this arrangement,
² each ¯rm pays a royalty to the other on the units of the enhanced products it
sells;
² the royalty paid by the previous patentholder is positive, but possibly smaller
than the royalty paid by the improver;
² the previous patentholder has no incentive to undermine the monopoly on the
enhanced product by selling the inferior product;
² the pro¯ts can be divided arbitrarily by using ¯xed fees as well as royalties.
We thus conclude that when manufacturing costs are the same regardless of
which ¯rm supplies the market, a cross-licensing agreement is pro¯t neutral with
respect to the benchmark solution (1) of allowing the patentholders to consolidate
their patent rights. By the minimalist principle, there is no need to allow price ¯xing in
addition to royalties, and the decision against price-¯xing in Line Material is therefore
consistent with our principles.
This may change, however, if each ¯rm's marginal cost of production is increas-
ing, or if the ¯rms have di®erent marginal costs of production. In that case, royalties
and ¯xed fees may not be pro¯t neutral. Pro¯ts may be higher under solution (1)
than (2).
If, for example, the enhancer has lower (constant) marginal costs of production,
the only e±cient arrangement is for ¯rm 2 to supply the whole market. The royalties
that would induce ¯rm 2 to supply the whole market would have to be low (zero)
f o r¯ r m2a n dh i g hf o r¯ r m1 . B u ti f½1 > ¢; ¯rm 1 has an incentive to enter the
market with the inferior product, competing against ¯rm 2, and depressing its price.
Cross-licensing to manufacture and produce the enhanced product does not prevent
this, even though both ¯rms would be better o® preventing it.
28When productive e±ciency is at issue, royalties and ¯xed fees may not be
enough instruments to ensure (i) that the output is manufactured e±ciently, (ii) that
the market price is pro¯t-maximizing, and (iii) that the inferior product stays o® the
market. In fact, for relatively large values of ¢; cross licensing will result in one of
the following problems.
1. Manufacturing costs are unnecessarily high due to unequal production in the
¯rms, and therefore the ¯rms earn less than the maximum pro¯t.
2. Manufacturing is e±cient, but the ¯rms earn less than the maximum pro¯t
because the royalties are too low.
3. The ¯rms earn less than the maximum pro¯t because the inferior product is also
on the market.
To see this more formally, modify the above model so that the marginal costs
of manufacturing are given by a function °(¢), as in section 2 above, and for simplicity,

















¤ (¢)) = 1 + ¢ ¡ q
¤(¢)
The optimum clearly requires equal production in the two ¯rms. To support equal
production, the royalties must be equal, ½1 = ½2: However, to prevent the ¯rst paten-
tholder from supplying the inferior product, the royalties must satisfy ½1 · ¢. In the
appendix, we show that the royalties required to support the pro¯t maximizing price
are
½1 = ½2 =
1
4







29However, if ½2 = ½1 > ¢; these will not sustain the pro¯t maximum, since ¯rm
1 will supply the inferior product instead of the enhanced product, thus depriving ¯rm
2 of royalties. The condition (3.22) may be inconsistent with ½2 = ½1 · ¢i f¢> 1
3
and costs ° are relatively low: There are several ways to solve these problems, but
they may require terms of license beyond cross licensing the enhanced product. Two
possibilities are
1. (Exclusive dealing) Write into the terms of license that ¯rm 1 will not supply
the inferior product, and write royalty rates that satisfy (3.22). Distribute the
p r o ¯ tw i t h¯ x e df e e s .





and ¯x the price for both ¯rms at p(q¤(¢)):
Exclusive dealing is generally treated under rule of reason (see the 1995 An-
titrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property, section 5.4). Our suggestion is
that, by the neutrality principle, exclusive dealing of this type should be per se legal,
especially if the second solution remains per se illegal (Line Material). In any case,
whether the second solution will keep the inferior good o® the market depends on the
costs of producing the inferior good. Any unit if the inferior good that is supplied
will either remain unsold due to rationing at the ¯xed price, or will crowd out a sale
of the enhanced good by one of the ¯rms. If the unit remains unsold, then producing
it is clearly unpro¯table, so suppose that it crowds out a sale of the enhanced good.
The marginal unit can provide no more than [p(q¤(¢)) ¡ ¢] ¡ ~ °(0) as pro¯t; where
~ °(0) is the marginal cost of the ¯rst unit of the inferior good. The pro¯t provided
by the crowded-out unit is p(q¤(¢)) ¡ °(
q¤(¢)
2 ) ,w h e t h e ri tw o u l dh a v eb e e ns o l db y
¯rm 1 or ¯rm 2: (If it would have been sold by ¯rm 2, the lost pro¯t is lost royalty.)
Provided that the cost ~ °(0) is greater than °(
q¤(¢)
2 ) ¡ ¢; the unit is less pro¯table
than the enhanced good it crowded out.
304 .T h eF i r s t - S a l eR u l e
The \¯rst sale" or \exhaustion" principle holds that patentees and their licensees lose
the ability to control how an invention is used once they have sold it. This means,
among other things, that the General Electric price-¯xing exception cannot apply
after the ¯rst sale has occurred. Because courts have held that transactions called
\licenses" may in fact be \sales," the ¯rst-sale rule is subject to some ambiguity. The
issue is whether the patentee has surrendered ownership and transferred risk. Under
the risk interpretation, patentees and licensees can avoid triggering the ¯rst-sale rule
by transferring goods to one or more middlemen under consignment (Mallinckrodt,
Inc. 1990).
Here we are not discussing risk, but the ¯rst-sale rule is of interest because
patented products such as a gasoline additive can either be sold or licensed. The
reader can verify that, in those cases above where royalties and ¯xed fees lead to
pro¯t neutrality, wholesale prices and ¯xed fees also lead to pro¯t neutrality. If the
patented object can be sold rather than licensed, then the wholesale price serves the
role of a (constant) royalty.
Conversely, where royalties and ¯xed fees do not su±ce for pro¯t neutrality,
we would suspect that the ¯rst-sale rule also obstructs pro¯t neutrality. Indeed, we
have uncovered one such case, that of blocking patents. One possible solution is to
cross-license. Another is for ¯rm 2 to sell the enhancement (the gasoline additive) to
¯rm 1 (proprietor of the inferior product), while ¯rm 1 grants a license to ¯rm 2 in
return for royalties. As we discussed in section 3.3, cross licensing may not support
the same pro¯t as consolidated ownership of the patents, and neither will selling the
enhancement under the ¯rst-sale rule.
We hasten to add, however, that this is a special case, and the proprietor of the
additive has the option to license instead of sell. If the licensing rule could remedy
the nonneutrality, there would be no need to tamper with the ¯rst-sale rule.
315. Rule of Reason
Rule of reason permits the court to treat a given license term di®erently in di®erent
circumstances. In general, rule of reason and per se r u l e sl i k et h eo n es t a t e di nGeneral
Electric lead to di®erent outcomes.
In order to have content, a rule-of-reason approach must specify what facts the
court can consider and how should it analyze them. Otherwise, saying that courts
should follow a rule-of-reason approach is not prescriptive enough to be useful. In
this section we discuss two interpretations of what rule of reason might mean in the
patent-antitrust context, and in the next section compare those approaches to the one
suggested in this paper.
The ¯rst approach is the one suggested by the U.S. Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission who say that the bene¯ts of allowing the licensor
\to exploit its [intellectual] property as e±ciently and e®ectively as possible," must
outweigh the harm to competition (1995 Antitrust Guidelines). As we pointed out in
the introduction, harm can arise in the innovation context either because innovations
are sti°ed in the ¯rst place, or because the innovator receives too extensive a monopoly,
leading to unnecessary market power after the fact. If the harm to competition is
narrowly concerned with the ex post market for the patented product, then rule of
reason would proscribe all restrictive terms of license, including royalties as well as
price ¯xing. That is obviously an unworkable conclusion. In devising the concept
of \innovation markets," the antitrust agencies also recognized the importance of
supporting competition for innovations themselves.
This approach does very little to clarify the boundary between Congress' re-
sponsibility in policy making, and the responsibility of the courts in preserving com-
petition. In balancing ex post deadweight loss against incentives to innovate, rule
of reason becomes a factual inquiry into the appropriate reward. In this factual in-
quiry, should the court naively assume that the costs of the patentholder determine
the necessary reward? Or should the factual inquiry about costs consider that some
32other inventor could have achieved the patent more cheaply, and that too much reward
only encourages waste? Should the inquiry consider that research is risky, and that a
discoverer would only have invested if he expected a super-reward if successful? Given
that the research endeavor was eventually successful, what evidence could be adduced
to show that it might not have been, and with what probability? The considerations
seem endless and extend far beyond evidence before the court.
Another, related interpretation of rule of reason was proposed by Kaplow
(1984), who suggested the principle that a given restrictive practice should be al-
lowed if it increases the (per-unit-time) ratio of pro¯t to deadweight loss. Congress
could then adjust the life of the right to adjust the overall reward. This is an eco-
nomically sensible idea, but it makes no clear separation between policy-setting with
respect to rewards and the antitrust treatment of licensing. Tellingly, the same prin-
ciple was resuscitated in the 1990's as a principle about patent design, rather than
antitrust rules (see Klemperer 1990, Gilbert and Shapiro 1990, Gallini 1992, Maurer
and Scotchmer 2002). In our view, patent design is the context to which it is best
suited.
In short, the most troubling aspect of rule of reason is that it does not draw
a boundary between policy-setting and antitrust jurisprudence at all. The two are
almost completely con°ated. This paper retreats from that con°ation. We adopt
the conceit that Congress has been clear on its policies, particularly as to length and
breadth of an intellectual property right. Within that policy context, courts should
then conduct an antitrust inquiry governed by the three principles we have suggested.
6. Deriving Per Se Rules from the Three Principles
The virtue of our three principles is that they can be applied in many di®erent con-
texts to arrive at sensible and unambiguous per se rules. We have investigated two
such contexts above. This is not to suggest that the principles will be useful in all
circumstances, or that they will resolve all controversies, but that is not a reason to
discard them in cases where they are useful. In this section we elaborate more on the
33meanings of the principles, and how they might be used.
Our just-reward principle does not mean that Congress has in mind a certain
size for the inventor's reward, and wants to give that reward in the least onerous way.
That point of view would transform the problem into an optimal-tax problem, in
which the tax needn't bear any relationship to the invention. Such a transformation
would undermine the incentive purpose of the patent system. Instead, our just-reward
principle assumes only that the length and breadth (and perhaps other policy levers
such as the right to reverse engineer) have been ¯xed, and within that framework,
that the inventor must earn her pro¯t from the value she has contributed. If the
social value of the invention is high, her pro¯t will typically be high, regardless of the
costs of invention. Our just-reward principle is not about the size of the reward, but
rather about its source. The innovator may or may not be entitled to $100,000, but if
she is, she had better earn it by taxing the bene¯ciaries of her invention, and not, for
example, by cartelizing a market she did not create. If the intellectual property right
is being exercised appropriately, it cannot make any user worse o® than he would be,
absent the invention. We have argued that this principle is embodied in both the
constitution and case law. Sham licensing is the usual name applied when a licensing
practice goes beyond the just-reward principle.
Some licensing practices, such as those considered in section 3.2, generate a
Pareto improvement. That is, the license makes the rightholder better o® without
making users worse o®. Such licenses are clearly in the public interest. However,
many practices { the controversial ones { seem to make users worse o® while making
inventors better o®, at least from an ex post point of view. This is where our pro¯t-
neutrality principle enters. To know whether the licensing practice makes users worse
o®, one must answer \compared to what." Our pro¯t-neutrality principle provides
the comparison. We assume that the rightholder is entitled to as much pro¯t as would
be available if he could work the patent e±ciently without licensees. He should not
be penalized because, for example, he cannot build manufacturing plants, and users
should not receive a corresponding windfall.
34Finally, the minimalism principle says that licensing practices should not be
tolerated unless required for pro¯t neutrality. Minimalism is a tie-breaking rule that
removes much of the potential for sham licenses. In much of the analysis above,
licensors could not increase their pro¯t by stipulating prices even if they were allowed
to do so. Allowing price-setting should therefore have no bene¯cial e®ect. In those
cases, there is no harm in proscribing it.
The di±culty, as we have pointed out, is that when there is an issue of produc-
tive e±ciency (when both the licensee and licensor are manufacturers), price setting
may be necessary for pro¯t neutrality. A per se rule would subsume those circum-
stances as factors that legitimate price-¯xing.
We admit that our per se rules eliminate the court's ability to ¯ne-tune patent
rewards after the fact, as might seem desirable based on the costs of development.
However, although the incentives needed in some industries may be higher than in
others, and it would be socially bene¯cial to distinguish those cases, rule-of-reason
analysis at the antitrust level may not be the place to do it. We think it wiser
to grant Congress its one-size-¯ts-all patent law, perhaps cleaving o® some subject
matters for sui generis treatment, and to use the three principles to determine which
license restrictions are acceptable.
7. Conclusion
The General Electric price-setting exception, as limited by subsequent courts, is for the
most part consistent with the just-reward, pro¯t-neutrality and minimalist principles.
The main situation where pro¯t neutrality requires price setting is when licensors and
licensees compete with each other, including cross licensing of blocking patents. The
minimalist principle should restrict it to those circumstances.
If this set of rules were abandoned in favor of rule of reason, Congress would
lose control over patent incentives. Of course, rule of reason also creates °exibility,
and allows rewards to be tailored to circumstances. However we are not con¯dent
35that this °exibility will be exercised in a way that is an improvement.
The various restrictions on patent licensing that have evolved in the case law
have long been criticized as ad hoc and incoherent. The absence of a unifying princi-
ple has made patentholders reluctant to write creative license terms, since it has been
di±cult to predict their legality. Such uncertainty can chill the licensor's ability to
exploit the patent right. Our three principles provide a coherent framework for de-
ciding when a particular license term should receive antitrust immunity, and provides
a language in which lawyers can argue their case.
8. Appendix:
8.1. Fixing a Licensee's Price, but not the Licensor's Price
We showed in section 2.1 that General Electric restores pro¯t neutrality by ¯xing the
licensee's price to match the licensor's price. Here we show that it is not enough
simply to specify a price for the licensee, without committing the licensor to the same
price.
To support the monopoly pro¯t, the stipulated price will have to be p(q¤); and
the equilibrium supplies will have to be q1 = q2 =
q¤
2 : Supposing that q2 =
q¤
2 the
royalty must be (2.12) in order to ensure that q1 =
q¤
2 . Then, since the licensee
cannot charge a price higher than p(q¤); he has no incentive to cut supply in order to
raise the market price. And he has no incentive to increase supply, since he would
then pay more in royalties and costs than the price of the marginal unit.
Thus, the price-¯x will ensure that the licensee supplies the optimal quantity,
q¤
2 . However, it is still not easy to control the licensor's incentive to be opportunistic.
With a ¯xed price for the licensee, the licensor wants to increase supply beyond
q¤
2 ,
and thus pro¯t at the licensee's expense.
De¯ning the licensor's pro¯t function will now be a little trickier because of the
out-of-equilibrium rationing problem. To test whether q1 = q2 =
q¤
2 is an equilibrium,
36the licensor must hypothesize what will happen if he increases or decreases his own
supply. If he deviates in supply, there will be two prices in the market. If the licensor
cuts supply, so that aggregate supply is less than q¤; the licensor's supply price will be
higher than p(q¤); while the licensee's price is ¯xed at p(q¤): If the licensor increases
supply, his supply will be sold at a price lower than p(q¤), while the licensee sells at
p(q¤):
Regardless of a buyer's willingness to pay, he would rather buy a cheaper unit
than a more expensive unit, and therefore the cheaper units will have to be rationed
among buyers. We assume that all of the cheaper units are sold, but that some of the
higher-priced supply might remain unsold. A customer might buy from the higher-
priced ¯rm if he cannot get a lower-priced unit, but only if his willingness to pay is
above the higher price. But if most of the customers with relatively high willingness
to pay manage to buy from the lower-priced ¯rm, then the only remaining customers
for the higher-priced ¯rm are those with lower willingness to pay, who may choose
instead to stay out of the market. Thus, the number of units that the higher-priced
¯rm sells depends on the rationing rule.
I ti sc l e a rt h a tt h el i c e n s o rw i l ln o tw a n tt oc u th i ss u p p l yb e l o w
q¤
2 ; because he
would not want to do this even if he could sell all his units at the higher price required
to clear the market, p(q1 + q2)=p(q1 +
q¤
2 ). Using (2.2), pro¯t is increasing with q1
at q1 =
q¤
2 . Thus, for reducing the supply instead of increasing it (dq1 < 0 instead of
dq1 > 0); pro¯t will decrease. The worry, as in the previous section, is not that the
licensor will want to cut supply, but that he will want to increase it.
If the licensor increases supply, he will be the lower-priced ¯rm selling all his
units. However, the licensee may not sell all his units. We will describe the rationing
rule by a decreasing (or nonincreasing) di®erentiable function ^ q2:[
q¤
2 ;1) ! [0;
q¤
2 ]
where ^ q2(q1) is the number of units that the licensee can sell if he produces
q¤
2 units
and the licensor produces q1 units, q1 >
q¤




2 ,w h i c hm e a n s
that demand is exactly met if both ¯rms produce
q¤
2 , selling at the market-clearing
price p(q¤): Since ^ q2 is decreasing with q1; ^ q2(q1) ·
q¤
2 ; as is logically necessary, since
37the licensee cannot sell more than he produces. The assumption that the licensees'
sales, ^ q2; are decreasing with q1 re°ects rationing. If there are more lower-priced
units, there will be more consumers with high willingness to pay ¯nding them, and
that cuts into the licensee's sales. By increasing supply and selling lower-priced units,
the licensor crowds out sales by the licensee.
Two special cases are complete crowding out, so that
d^ q2(q1)
dq1 = ¡1; and no
crowding out, so that
d^ q2(q1)
dq1 =0 :
Then the licensor's pro¯t function is the following:
^ ¼
1(q1;q 2)=p(q1 +^ q2 (q1))q1 + ½^ q2 (q1) ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (8.1)
=( 1 ¡ q1 ¡ ^ q2 (q1))q1 + ½^ q2 (q1) ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (8.2)
=( 1 ¡ q1)q1 ¡ (q1 ¡ ½)^ q2 (q1) ¡
Z q1
0
°(^ q)d^ q (8.3)
Taking the derivative with respect to q1;
@^ ¼1(q1;q 2)
@q1




Evaluating at q1 = q2 =
q¤
2 ; and using (2.12) and (2.2), the derivative is zero in the
extreme case of complete crowding out,
d^ q2(q1)
dq1 = ¡1; but otherwise positive. Even
with the ¯xed price, the licensor will behave opportunistically in increasing supply.
The problem cannot be solved by making the royalty ½ larger, since the licensee would
not then be willing to produce
q¤
2 units.
In the special case of complete crowding out, the ¯xed-price license can support
the pro¯t maximum. With complete crowding out, the licensor is punished for his
supply deviation by losing a lot of royalty revenue. However complete crowding will
be unlikely. It essentially means that all the customers with lower willingness to
pay who could have been brought into the market by the licensor's increased supply
have found themselves at the higher-priced ¯rm, and therefore decide not to purchase.
This would not happen with random assignment of customers to ¯rms.
388.2. Cross Licensing when ¯rms have increasing marginal cost
We augment section 3.3, showing why royalties must satisfy (??)i no r d e rf o rt h e
cross license to support the monopoly price for the enhanced good, assuming that the
inferior product is not supplied. Taking as given the royalties (½1;½ 2) and ¯rm 2's
supply, q2, ¯rm 1's pro¯t, as a function of its own supply q1;is
µ










(1 + ¢ ¡ q2 ¡ ½1 ¡ °(q1)) (8.4)




(1 + ¢ ¡ q1 ¡ ½2 ¡ °(q2)) (8.5)
By adding (3.17) and (3.18), setting q1 = q2 =
1
2q¤(¢); it follows that
q1 + q2 =
2
3
(1 + ¢) ¡
1
3














instead of (3.15). Since the royalty rates must be equal in order to sustain equal
output, (3.22) follows.
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